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Abstract 
This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness 
adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary 
of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional 
computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on 
variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, 
as well as bringing out tensions in IIT’s treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, 
though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in 
particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a 
scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as 
solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must 
await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe 
consciousness to it. 
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“The real test is to show you she is a robot. Then see if 
you still feel she has consciousness.” Alex Garland, Ex 
Machina. 
 
1. Functionalism and Integrated Information 
 
Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) has attracted widespread interest 
from researchers pursuing a scientific understanding of consciousness, recruiting 
prominent advocates, such as neuroscientist Cristoph Koch. 1 The theory, as promoted 
by Tononi, has both a mathematical aspect and a philosophical aspect. The 
mathematical aspect centres on an attempt to define a formal measure of integrated 
information, denoted Φ, that captures the extent to which the parts of a system are 
influenced by the whole while retaining their distinct functionality. The philosophical 
aspect of the theory concerns the application of this measure to physical systems, 
notably to the brain, in which context it is intended to quantify the presence (or 
otherwise) of consciousness. 
 
One consequence of the philosophical aspect of the theory is that functionalism is 
false with respect to consciousness. Indeed, IIT appears to embody a particularly 
strong form of anti-functionalism according to which human-level AI, if implemented 
on a conventional digital computer, would lack consciousness, irrespective of its high-
level functional architecture and behaviour. Moreover, as made explicit in a recently 
published paper, Tononi and Koch believe that a neuron-by-neuron, synapse-by-
synapse digital simulation of a human brain would experience nothing, even if it were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Balduzzi & Tononi (2007); Oizumi, et al. (2014); Tononi & Koch (2015). 
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behaviourally indistinguishable from the biological original. 2 Phenomenologically 
speaking, it would be a zombie. 3 
 
Not only does IIT incorporate a precisely defined metric (Φ) for the “amount of 
consciousness”, the integrated information, in a given system, it also specifies how 
the world is to be divided up for the purposes of applying this measure. This enables it 
to answer questions about the boundaries of consciousness. Does consciousness reside 
wholly in the brain? Is it perhaps confined to just part of the brain? Or does it 
encompass the rest of a person’s body? Does it perhaps include parts of the 
environment too, such as the tools we use, as certain advocates of externalism would 
claim? Advocates of IIT favour the first of these options on the grounds that 
consciousness is intrinsic to a system of elements x only if that system cannot be 
partitioned into a set of sub-systems any of which has a higher Φ than x itself, and the 
brain (or perhaps some large part of it, such as the cerebral cortex) is assumed to be 
irreducible in this sense. 
 
A system that is irreducible in this way is called a complex, and its integrated 
information is denoted Φmax. According to IIT, the brain is conscious because it 
includes a major complex with high Φmax. The theory also allows for the brain to 
include additional minor complexes with non-zero Φmax, independent sub-systems 
with their own minimal consciousness. 4 However, none of these sub-systems would 
enjoy higher Φ than the brain itself. By contrast, according to Tononi and Koch, 
consciousness would be absent in a digitally simulated brain because “the computer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Tononi & Koch (2015). Specifically, they ask “what about a computer whose 
software simulates in detail not just our behaviour, but even the biophysics of neurons, 
synapses and so on, of the relevant portion of the human brain? Could such a digital 
simulacrum ever be conscious?” (p.15). Their answer is that it could not. This claim is 
the main target of the present paper. 
3 This notion of a zombie is differs from that often employed in the philosophical 
literature, which is defined to be physically as well as behaviourally indistinguishable 
from the original. 
4 Ibid, fig.15(b). 
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would likely not form a large complex of high Φmax, but break down into many mini-
complexes of low Φmax”. 5 
 
To see why this might be the case, it’s necessary to have some idea of how Φ is 
defined and deployed within the theory. Tononi & Koch offer an illustrative example 
of a simple system that has non-zero Φ paired with a functionally equivalent system 
(with more components) that has zero Φ. 6 In such examples, the essential property 
that the system with non-zero Φ has that its zero-Φ counterpart lacks is recurrent 
connectivity. The presence of feedback entails that the system’s transitions are 
irreducibly dependent on its own internal state, and that it therefore (in a specific 
sense) generates more information as a whole than all of its component parts generate 
separately. This confers a value of Φ greater than zero. The functionally equivalent 
feed-forward system, by contrast, generates no more information as a whole than the 
information generated by its (more numerous) parts, and therefore has zero Φ. 
 
On a very much larger scale, a real biological brain and its functionally equivalent 
digital simulation are an analogous pair of systems. The biological brain has 
numerous dense recurrent connections, which contribute to its high Φ. By contrast, 
Tononi and Koch hypothesise that a digital computer will have very low Φ, because it 
comprises (very numerous and very fast-acting) components (namely transistors) 
whose transitions depend on just a tiny subset of the rest of the system. This will be 
true whatever program the computer is running, even if that program is a flawless 
simulation of a human brain. 
 
2. Gradual Neuronal Replacement 
 
There is no need to elucidate this claim further in order to expose its vulnerability to 
an argument made popular by David Chalmers. The argument in question centres on a 
thought experiment in which the neurons in a person’s brain are gradually replaced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid, p.15. 
6 See fig.16 of Oizumi & Tononi (2014). 
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electronic equivalents. 7  Because this is a thought experiment, the technological 
feasibility of the procedure is irrelevant. But we might imagine an injection into the 
bloodstream that transports tens of billions of nanobots to the brain. There, each 
neuron is targeted by a team of nanobots which assesses the electrochemical 
signalling behaviour of the cell body, maps out its axonal and dendritic connectivity, 
and computes the specification of a digital equivalent. The team of nanobots then 
reconfigures itself to match this specification. They are then ready to plug themselves 
in, switch out the real neuron, and take over its function. 
 
A premise of the thought experiment is that replacing a neuron with a digital 
equivalent in this way will preserve the behaviour not only of that individual 
component but also of the system as a whole. This entails that the behaviour of a 
person whose brain undergoes a neuronal replacement will be indistinguishable from 
the behaviour of the fully biological original. Even that person’s friends and loved 
ones would be unable to tell the difference. Now let us suppose that the neurons of a 
particular subject are replaced one at a time. The question is what happens to their 
consciousness as this process unfolds. 
 
The options seem to be threefold. Either a) consciousness is an all-or-nothing property 
that suddenly vanishes when a certain threshold of neurons is replaced, b) 
consciousness gradually fades, disappearing altogether when the last neuron is 
replaced, or c) consciousness persists throughout the procedure. Functionalism with 
respect to consciousness entails the third option: persistence. By contrast, it follows 
directly from Tononi and Koch’s argument that they favour the second option: 
gradual fading. According to their version of IIT, as the proportion of digitally 
simulated neurons gradually increases, Φ will gradually decrease, becoming 
negligible when the neurons are 100% replaced. In the end, the subject will become a 
phenomenological zombie, mindlessly insisting on its own consciousness even though 
there is, in fact, “no-one at home”. 
 
In order for the thought experiment to work in the context of the claim being targeted 
here, we need to stipulate the gradual digital replacement not only of individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chalmers (1996), ch.7. See also Shanahan (2015), ch.5. 
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neurons, but also of their connections. This is important since the thought experiment 
must see the graudal loss of the physical recurrent feedback connections that seem to 
be demanded by IIT for high Φ. So let us assume that the hypothesised nanobots, 
rather than taking over the function of a neuron themselves, act as tiny 
communication devices. The job of the nanobots then is to digitise and transmit the 
neuron’s input signals to an external computer, where the relevant simulated 
computation takes place, and to receive the resulting output signal which they then 
pass on to other neurons. This will allow us to assume, moreover, that every time a 
neuron is replaced by a software-simulated equivalent, so are all the relevant 
structures (axons, synapses, and dendrites) connecting that neuron to others that have 
already undergone simulation. This will make the nanobots themselves gradually 
redundant as more and more of the brain is “uploaded” to the external computer. 8 
 
Now, let’s elaborate the thought experiment a little by supposing that the person who 
undergoes gradual neuronal replacement is an advocate of IIT. Indeed, let’s imagine 
that it is Tononi himself, and let’s call the “person” left when all his neurons have 
been replaced Twin Tononi (TT). Furthermore, let’s imagine that the procedure is 
carried out without Tononi’s knowledge. (Since it is a thought experiment, we don’t 
have to obtain ethical approval.) Recall that, by hypothesis, TT’s behaviour will be 
indistinguishable from that of the original, fully biological Tononi. So TT will 
continue to advocate integrated information theory. TT will espouse the same 
philosophical position, rejecting functionalism on the grounds outlined in his paper 
with Koch. Moreover, TT will insist on his own consciousness. 
 
The final step in the elaborated thought experiment is to expose TT to the truth. He 
undergoes a brain scan, and is shown what really goes on inside his own head — his 
biological neurons are inactive, and everything he says or does is the product of 
digitally simulated neuronal activity. What would TT then say about the claims made 
in the Tononi and Koch paper? Up to that point, of course he would have been an 
enthusiastic endorser of these claims, being their first author. But exposure to his true 
physical nature puts TT in an uncomfortable position. The options are threefold. He 
must either a) profess scepticism towards what he has been shown about his own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chalmers (2010) outlines a similar extension to the thought experiment. 
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inner workings, b) renounce his claim to consciousness, or c) disavow his previous 
rejection of functionalism. 
 
Let us set aside the first option. After all, such scepticism would be misplaced, since 
TT’s brain is indeed a digital simulation and it would not be to his credit if no amount 
of evidence could persuade him of the truth. What about the second option? Would 
TT be willing to renounce his claim to consciousness? This seems most unlikely. 
Early in Tononi and Koch’s paper, they assert that consciousness “is the one fact I am 
absolutely certain of—all the rest is conjecture”. In other words, they subscribe to the 
near-universal philosophical view that self-knowledge about consciousness is 
indubitable. Now, we know that TT’s inner workings are functionally equivalent to 
Tononi’s. So whatever chains of cause and effect give rise to Tononi’s assertions of 
indubitable self-knowledge, functionally equivalent chains of cause and effect will be 
at work in TT, issuing in the same pronouncements. 
 
So we are left with the third option. Unable to deny his own consciousness, yet 
knowing his brain to be a digital simulation, TT will be obliged to withdraw his 
objection to functionalism. The question now is what the real Tononi and Koch would 
have to say about Twin Tononi and his retraction. If they are to retain their own anti-
functionalist views, they must argue that TT is wrong, which entails that he should 
have accepted one of the other options. They surely wouldn’t expect TT to refuse to 
accept the true nature of his inner workings. Rather, to maintain their anti-
functionalism, they would have to assert that TT is wrong about his own 
consciousness. Twin Tononi, they would say, is a zombie, his most passionate 
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
3. The Fragility of Self-Knowledge 
 
It would be instructive to pit Twin Tononi against real Tononi to see how they set 
about resolving their differences. As something of an expert on the matter, TT ought 
to be well placed to find flaws in Tononi and Koch’s position. Indeed, we could ask 
the real Tononi, “How would you amend IIT if you discovered your brain was a 
digital simulation?” But his reply would likely be along the lines, “Well that is 
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impossible, so the question is meaningless”. Of course, if that were his reply then TT 
would dismiss the same question in the same way, prior to being shown the truth. We 
might press Tononi by asking him, “How do you know you are not a digital 
simulation?” And he would no doubt reply, “Because I am conscious, and according 
to IIT that entails that I am not a digital simulation”. And again, that is exactly what 
TT would say too, prior to learning his true nature. Finally, we might ask Tononi, 
“How do you know you are conscious?” And whatever response he gave would also 
be the response of TT. 
 
To get past this impasse, let’s try torture. 9 First, let’s imagine that the transformation 
from real Tononi to Twin Tononi can be reversed. Suppose that, at the flick of a 
switch, the digitally simulated neurons in TT’s brain can be switched off, while all the 
dormant biological neurons are simultaneously woken up to resume their function, 
appropriately modified to reflect any changes (eg: in synaptic weight) undergone by 
their digital counterparts. According to IIT the resulting version of Tononi should be a 
fully conscious creature with the same high Φ as the biological original. Now suppose 
we carry out the following sequence of actions. We start with real Tononi and 
perform the procedure that turns him into TT. Then, without revealing to him his true, 
simulated nature, we subject TT to torture. Finally we reverse the procedure, restoring 
Tonini’s brain to fully biological operation. 
 
According to IIT’s anti-functionalist position, TT feels nothing while he is being 
tortured. He screams, he bleeds, he writhes, and he begs for mercy. But all this is a 
sham if we accept the philosophical implications of IIT. TT has negligible Φ and 
therefore no consciousness. He is incapable of experiencing pain. Nevertheless, it 
seems a pretty safe bet that real Tononi, restored to biological function and unaware 
of the whole charade, will have a few complaints about his treatment. By hypothesis, 
his behaviour will be exactly the same as it would have been if his neurons had been 
biological all along. Under the circumstances, that behaviour is sure to include a 
grumble or two. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the event that Giulio Tononi reads this paper, I hope he will take all this in the 
spirit of intellectual enquiry that it is intended. 
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Now suppose we reveal to Tononi the truth. During the period of torture, his brain 
was merely a digital simulation, and the whole thing was just a joke. How likely is it 
that he would withdraw his complaints, that he would see the funny side? From 
Tononi’s standpoint, the memory of his “fake” torture would be no less convincing 
than the memory of real torture. But Tononi doesn’t have to compromise his 
intellectual position in order to complain about being tortured. “I see now that these 
memories aren’t real”, he might say. “It only seems as if I felt pain when in fact I 
must have felt nothing. My memories are deceiving me. Nevertheless, I am 
experiencing those memories, and that is horrible enough. So you really shouldn’t 
have done that to me.” 
 
It seems implausible that anyone would go so far as to deny their own memory of 
torture in order to preserve their allegiance to a stance on functionalism. But fair 
enough. Let us allow this. By way of apology we will offer Tononi $10,000, as long 
as he agrees to undergo the procedure one more time. But this time we will undertake 
to wipe all memory of the torture from his (digital) brain prior to the switch-back to 
biological neurons. If the Tononi of our thought experiement really believed his anti-
functionalist rhetoric, this would surely be easy money. It would involve no real pain 
and no unpleasant (false) memories of pain. He surely ought to agree. But I venture 
that no-one, not even the most dedicated (and impoverished) adherent to IIT, would 
agree to such a proposal. 
 
Now let’s get back to Tononi and Koch’s (presumed) rejection of TT’s claims to self-
knowledge? Can IIT really sanction Tononi’s own claim to such knowledge while 
denying it to his digital twin? To answer this question we need to understand what 
sort of mechanism might underpin a person’s knowledge of their own consciousness 
according to IIT. The main desideratum here is that a person’s consciousness must 
itself be causally implicated in any legitimate claim they make to this sort of self-
knowledge. And according to IIT, a person is conscious because their brain has high 
Φ. So the possession of high Φ must be causally implicated in any such claim. But 
how could the brain’s high Φ be causally implicated in that way? How, in general, 
could a system have internal access to the fact of its own high Φ? 
 
	   10	  
Well, it is possible to imagine such a system. Suppose a system x is capable of 
computing the integrated information Φ for any given system y. Moreover, suppose 
system x has high Φ, and is applied to itself, yielding a correspondingly high value. 
This system could legitimately claim to be conscious according to IIT, and to know 
that it was conscious. Let’s suppose this system is made of high Φ-promoting 
components, such as biological neurons. Now, reprising our thought experiment, 
imagine that we replaced all of these components with functionally equivalent digital 
versions, so that the resulting system was behaviourally identical to the original 
system x but had low Φ. Then, when applied to itself, this system would “do the right 
thing”, and pronounce itself lacking in consciousness. 
 
But the brain is not such a system. The high Φ of a person’s brain plays no causal role 
in their pronouncements about their own consciousness. If a person claims to be 
certain of their own consciousness, it is not because they have studied a detailed scan 
of the physical structure of their brain and subjected it to the mathematical analysis 
demanded by IIT. A person seems to require no access to their brain’s internal 
workings to claim indubitable knowledge of their own consciousness. It’s hard to see 
why, from the standpoint of IIT, Tononi is any more justified in making such a claim 
than his digital counterpart. Tononi and TT make exactly the same pronouncements 
on the matter, and they do so thanks to isomorphic chains of cause and effect in which 
their own Φ, whether high or low, is nowhere implicated. 
 
4. Science Without Metaphysics 
 
Where does all this leave IIT? The version of the theory professed by Tononi and 
Koch entails a dubious position on digital brain simulation and is unable to account 
for the sort of self-knowledge it takes to be axiomatic. However, there is plenty to 
redeem it. When shorn of its metaphysical pretensions, the scientifically useful core 
of integrated information theory is revealed. This is the idea that a) we ascribe 
consciousness to humans (and other animals) because their brains are complex 
dynamical systems in which there is mutual influence between the whole and the parts, 
b) this influence can be mathematically quantified using information theory, and c) 
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the resulting measure can be empirically validated and has clinical application. 10 
There is no need to solve the “hard problem” nor to explain “qualia”, notions that tend 
to bewitch the philosophically inclined (among whom I count myself), and lead them 
to see conceptual difficulties where none exist. 
 
Let’s revisit the topics of functionalism and self-knowledge with this admonition in 
mind. Consider functionalism. Doesn’t functionalism have metaphysical pretentions 
of its own? Doesn’t it proffer a solution to the hard problem, purport to explain qualia, 
and so on. Well, the aim here is not to defend functionalism per se. The moral, rather, 
is that the acceptability of any theory of consciousness depends on nothing more than 
how well it holds up when put to use, whether by scientists or in everyday life. So 
functionalism can limit its claims to the empirical: we ascribe consciousness to 
something when it has a certain functional organisation, and therefore exhibits certain 
behaviour. The required functional organisation and the right sort of behaviour might 
turn out to go hand in hand with the capacity to integrate information in a sense close 
to that of IIT. In that case a suitably modified definition of Φ would have the potential 
to illuminate the sort of functional organisation that underlies ascriptions of 
consciousness. 
 
Be that as it may, there is no need for the functionalist or the advocate of IIT to go 
further, to address the “hard problem”, to explain “qualia”, to make metaphysical 
claims about what consciousness really “is”. Equally, it is inappropriate to dictate, on 
metaphysical grounds, how a notion like integrated information is to be applied in 
advance of our trying it out in particular circumstances. When it comes to exotic cases, 
such as digital whole brain emulations, thought experiments are helpful. As for 
human-level artificial intelligence, whatever form it takes, whether human-like or not, 
we must await our encounter with it. Only then will we discover what the right 
attitude towards it is, whether to treat it as conscious or not. 11 We will work through 
our doubts, confirming them or allaying them, by observing and interacting with our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Seth, et al. (2011), for example. 
11 See Wittgenstein (1958), p.178: “‘I believe that he is not an automaton’ just like 
that, so far makes no sense. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I 
am not of the opinion tha he has a soul”. 
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creations. To stipulate in advance of this encounter what is or is not conscious is to let 
the metaphysical tail wag the empirical dog. 
 
Of course, it’s all very well to attack metaphysics. But to relinquish it isn’t simply a 
matter of linguistic censorship. For the philosophically inclined, dualistic thoughts 
tend to keep resurfacing, presenting a different facet each time. 12 Consider self-
knowledge. It doesn’t take much reflection to see that IIT’s difficulties with self-
knowledge also afflict functionalism. After all, the brain’s lack of access to its own 
internal workings extends to their functional organisation. So a subject’s supposedly 
indubitable knowledge of their own consciousness looks just as problematic for a 
functionalist as for a proponent of IIT. Yet no-one can doubt their own consciousness. 
Descartes was surely right on this point. So functionalism, like IIT, looks fatally 
flawed. Indeed, it’s hard to see how any theory could bridge the chasm between 
subjective self-knowledge and objective neuroscience. So we are back to the “hard 
problem”. 13 
 
However, consider the three sentences “I am conscious”, “I know I am conscious”, 
and “I am certain that I am conscious”. In all three cases, the epistemological content 
is the same. It is nil. Epistemologically speaking, all three pronouncements are 
analogous to a magician stepping out of a box with hands wide and shouting “Ta da!”. 
It would make no sense for the magician, inwardly, to ask himself “Am I sure?”. Nor 
would it would make sense for anyone in the audience to shout out “Prove it!”. The 
magician is presenting himself, not making a claim. Analogously, the three sentences 
in question stand as expressions of consciousness. In spite of their grammatical form, 
they are not propositions about consciousness, and they are not open to challenge as if 
they were. 
 
This is not to rule out the possibility of an apparent expression of consciousness that 
turns out, on investigation, to be no such thing. If a mannequin with a speech 
synthesiser in its head announces “I am conscious” then we do not take it to be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Shanahan (2010), ch.1. 
13 This, of course, is the conclusion that many philosophers have reached, including 
Nagel (1974) and Chalmers (1996). 
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genuine expression of consciousness. In more difficult cases, such as coma patients, 
extraterrestrials (if we encounter them), or human-level AIs (if we build them), the 
only way to decide the question is to investigate further. We might look inside their 
heads (if they have heads) to see what’s going on there. We might observe their 
behaviour and note how they respond to a variety of different stimuli. Preferably we 
will interact with them, and the richer the interaction the more confidently will we 
settle on the right attitude towards them. 
 
This is where theories of consciousness play a role. Done properly, a theory of 
consciousness should address the question “Under what conditions do we ascribe 
consciousness to something?”. This is an empirical question. To the extent that the 
answer takes the form “Consciousness is x” or “A state x is conscious if and only if y”, 
the word “is” (the insidious copula) should be metaphysically weightless. These 
answers are just shorthand for “We say something is conscious when x” or “We say a 
state x is conscious when y”. Functionalism, by these lights, labels a class of theories 
according to which we describe something as conscious when it instantiates a certain 
functional organisation (to be established through scientific investigation), and 
therefore exhibits certain behaviour. 
 
Of course, science is embedded in human affairs, and is apt to influence the things we 
do and say. So the scientific study of consciousness can help us deal with tricky or 
exotic cases, such as coma patients or human-level artificial intelligence. So, while it 
might start out with the aim of describing the way we use the word “conscious” and 
its relatives, the scientific study of consciousness can also end up modifying or 
extending the way we use those words. However, nowhere in this two-way street is 
there any call for metaphysics. 
 
The difficulty with IIT, as presented by Tononi and his colleagues, is that it is 
metaphysical through and through. It asserts that “there is an identity between 
phenomenological properties of experience and informational/causal properties of 
physical systems” [emphasis added]. 14 To establish this identity it insists on various a 
priori postulates. For example, “of all overlapping sets of elements [of a physical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Oizumi, et al. (2014), p.3. 
	   14	  
system], only one set can be conscious – the one whose mechanisms specify a 
conceptual structure that is maximally irreducible … to independent components”. 15 
Based on these postulates, various controversial consequences are derived a priori, 
including (as well as a brand of panpsychism) the denial of consciousness to any 
human-level AI implemented on a conventional computer. 
 
However, it is not appropriate to pronounce on the consciousness or otherwise of 
human-level AI when we don’t yet know what its presence in our society will be like. 
The temptation to do so stems from the conviction that subjective experience is a kind 
of “stuff”, something that exists intrinsically, for itself, but whose objective character 
is knowable a priori and can be described in the language of mathematics. Of course, 
to deny the reality of conscious experience would be an affront to common sense. To 
echo Wittgenstein’s words, experience in itself isn’t a nothing, but it isn’t a something 
either. 16 So there is no need either to affirm or deny it, and there is no call for a 
science of consciousness that proceeds from metaphysical assumptions or makes 
claims about it. 
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